

Election Security in California

(If we don't get it, your state very likely doesn't either)



I'm Melanie Bryson, and along with an awesome team from Indivisible East Bay, we're gonna share with you:
Important takeaways from recent experiences in California,
How these experiences are a microcosm of the challenges facing *all* the states, and
Actions we can *all* take before the November elections to secure our vote.

I. California is no more secure than any other state.
In LA county, on June 5th, nearly 120,000 voters went to the polls and found out their names weren't on the voter list.
Dean Logan, County Clerk, said, "it's a printing error".
Is that all there is to the story?

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Redacted voter file discovered by Kromtech

19 million California voter registration records were hacked in December, 2017.

Last December, cyber-criminals stole *19 million* voter registration records.

Was it an error in the LA County primary? Was it hacking?

How can we know?

Less than 4 months before the midterms, we still don't have good measures in place to safeguard our elections. Not even in California.

It was a “printing error”

Nearly 1 in 3 precincts
were affected in some way.

118,522 voters' names
were *omitted*.

Clerk Logan said everyone could still vote provisional. Unfortunately, only 85%-90% of provisionals are ever counted, and they're currently **exempt** from audit. Audits are how we resolve questions about elections; if we don't examine *all* of the ballots, we can't verify the election outcome, especially in a close race.

What now? There will be a follow up analysis; this will test *networks, servers and computer databases* for weaknesses.

But this was a printer thing, right? It didn't have anything to do with being connected to the internet. Did it?

It won't happen with a *new* system, "because that won't rely on a *printed roster*"



One week, after the primary, Logan asked the Board of Supervisors for **\$280 million dollars** for a new system, with **31,000** hackable electronic voting machines. The board UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED THE CONTRACT.

Logan bragged that the new system wouldn't need a *printed* roster at all.

The clerk's solution was to just get rid of *all the paper* — the *only* thing that Can't. Be. Hacked.

ACTION 1

Email your county election board.

Try to get them to commit, in writing, to having **paper voter registration lists** as backup for their e-poll books at **every polling place** in the midterms.

bit.ly/pollbooks2018

Here's what we want you to do: Connect with the members of your county election board. Try to get them to commit, in writing, to using *paper* voter registration lists — and have these as a **backup** for their electronic poll books at **every polling place** in the midterms.

Companies that make and manage elections software don't allow us to inspect their code, and clearly, states' voter registration lists are not safe from hacking. *If* e-pollbooks are used, polling places should have paper backups. Contact your County Election Board to *make sure* that they will!

bit.ly/pollbooks2018

Report back to us — We'll step up the pressure if your elections officials won't commit.

***The new bad guy on the block:
BALLOT MARKING DEVICES***




Ballot Marking Devices were designed to be used by voters who want or need help with accessibility, but they're being *widely* promoted for universal use.

When this equipment fails, we get long lines, and lots of people not voting. Hackers don't even have to change votes to keep your vote from being counted as cast — they just make the machine crash. *None of this can happen with hand marked ballots.* Even if optical scanners fail, you can still vote, and your vote will eventually get counted.

*hackable
Touchscreen 1.0*



*hackable
Touchscreen 2.0*



It was a problem then, It's a problem now

Newer touchscreen devices print out a summary; but it can be hard to read, and studies have shown that many voters don't check these anyway.

Worse, the scanner that counts your vote reads a *barcode* that gets printed, *not* the summary text. After an election, it's impossible to know if ANY ballot has been verified.

Thankfully, most of the old touchscreen machines are reaching the end of their serviceable lives. Yet, we again have a **failure to address the core issue**, which is that only *hand-marked* paper ballots can secure our vote.

ES&S ExpressVote

The new ES&S voting machine, the ExpressVote, has major problems, beginning with the fact that the voter cannot verify the ballot information that will be counted by examining the ballot. The voter may think that s/he is seeing a list of names that will be counted, but **it is the barcode, not the list, that is read by the scanner that counts the vote.**

Dr Duncan Buell & Dr Eleanor Hare
Board of the League of Women Voters of South Carolina

bit.ly/badmachines2018

Instead, localities are flocking to buy more unsafe touchscreen devices, including the 31,000 new machines ordered by Clerk Logan, which are **Ballot Marking Devices**.

What gets **counted**? Whatever the **code** says.

We've created a Google Doc to help sort out all the bad equipment.

bit.ly/BadMachines2018

We hope that at least one indivisible chapter from each state will join us. We need to demand that federal funds NOT be used for hackable systems.


| Vendor | Registrants Reached | % Market Share |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| Election Systems & Software | 83,380,867 | 43.8% |
| Dominion Voting Systems | 71,006,665 | 37.3% |
| Hart InterCivic | 20,983,037 | 11.0% |
| Unisyn Voting Solutions | 3,430,900 | 1.8% |
| MicroVote | 3,291,260 | 1.7% |
| Danaher | 2,685,409 | 1.4% |
| MTS | 2,435,360 | 1.3% |
| IVS | 1,336,070 | 0.7% |
| Five Cedars Group | 972,475 | 0.5% |
| Clear Ballot | 623,083 | 0.3% |

https://trustthevote.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2017-whartonoset_industryreport.pdf

At least we're **DE**-centralized, right?

(no, we're not actually)

Per this 2017 Wharton report, just *two* voting machine vendors, ES&S & Dominion, account for more than 80% of U.S. voting equipment!



Blue shows the jurisdictions that use ES&S.

Orange is Dominion.

ES&S & Dominion have a *profound* influence over our elections.

This **centralization** of our election systems further establishes how critical it is that states act BEFORE the 2018 midterms to require **hand-marked** paper ballots and audits after each & every election.

We can STILL secure our votes for the midterms!

Jurisdictions across the nation can and should provide **hand-marked** paper ballots for all voters this November.

All states offer absentee voting — in other words, they already have paper ballots.

Most counties have scanners that they already use to count paper absentee ballots.

They can use these scanners in November to count hand-marked paper ballots for all voters.

There's still a way to ensure the security of our votes in November.

Almost all states have paper ballot backup plans, and *all* states are required to offer absentee ballots. Almost every state has existing optical scanners. We want them to USE THESE.

ACTION 2

Demand paper ballots in these 13 states with paperless machines:

Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas

Everybody else: AUDITS

bit.ly/handmarked2018

bit.ly/hand-marked2018

We hope you will ALL join us in this:

There are 13 states that still have **paperless** machines. If you live in one of them, we want you to demand paper ballots. The idea is *not* to try to buy a fancy new voting system, but use *existing* scanners, and use the know how that Secretaries of State, Clerks and Registrars already have.

NOT in a paperless state? We want you to work on audits! Most county election boards have the authority to choose paper — and to *audit*.



FIRST 2 MAIN actions:

bit.ly/pollbooks2018 — Backup printed rosters for electronic pollbooks

bit.ly/handmarked2018 — How we get hand-marked paper ballots for the midterms (and audits in states that already have them)

California:

bit.ly/LAactions — 2 actions for LA county

Other:

bit.ly/badmachines2018 — Repository that we will continually update, with specific info on equipment to avoid

bit.ly/observe2018 — Beginning of a help document to get observers in place

All our actions are in a folder at bit.ly/SAFEguard — We'll be updating with even more targeted actions in the future.

Let's create another BIG BLUE WAVE — by showing up at our election boards, Clerks, and Secretaries of State until they take election security as seriously as we do.